Do China’s Antitrust Penalties Adequately Deter?

Shao Yang[1]

I. Introduction

In recent years, antitrust has become more and more important for China, which is consistent with the global trend. In 2018, China launched the reform of its antitrust authorities. Under that reform, the antitrust law enforcement functions formerly split among the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), the Ministry of Commerce, and the State Administration for Industry and Commerce were merged into the newly established State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR), which made good preparation for enhancing antitrust law enforcement. Moreover, the fact that the 2020 Central Economic Work Conference listed antitrust and preventing disorderly capital expansion as one of the eight economic key tasks in 2021[2] shows that the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) attaches great importance to antitrust now.

The situation of the administrative antitrust penalties is also proof of this trend. Antitrust authorities have imposed more and more penalties for monopolistic business undertakings (business operators) in recent years. The antitrust authorities on all levels imposed 12 administrative penalties on reaching monopolistic agreements and abuse of dominant market position in 2018 (excluding the concentration of undertakings cases)[3], 16 penalties in 2019[4], 25 penalties in 2020[5]. Additionally, SAMR is breaking its records for antitrust administrative penalties. On April 10, 2021, the SAMR published its penalty decision for Alibaba which imposed a fine in the amount of 18.228 billion yuan[6]. The penalty for Alibaba is almost 3 times the fine for Qualcomm[7] in 2015 which was the highest fine record before. China shows great ambition in enforcing the Anti-Monopoly Law (AML)[8] nowadays. The increasing antitrust administrative penalties are conducive to the realization of the purposes of the AML.

To fulfill the purpose of the AML, administrative penalties must create adequate deterrence to undertakings that reach monopolistic agreements or abuse their dominant market position. According to the AML, administrative liability and civil liability are the two kinds of liability for undertakings. In practice, administrative liability is the more important one. Besides, reaching monopolistic agreements and abuse of dominant market position are the most significant types of monopolistic conduct. Since the principal purpose of an administrative penalty in cartel cases is deterrence[9], it is essential for antitrust authorities to create adequate deterrence to reaching monopolistic agreements and abuse of market-dominant position to fulfill the purpose of the AML.

Have administrative antitrust penalties in China created adequate deterrence to these types of monopolistic conduct? The author’s answer to this is no. This article argues that the administrative antitrust penalties have not created adequate deterrence to undertakings reaching monopolistic agreements and abusing their dominant market positions and explains the reasons for it. It will suggest some ways the antitrust penalty system could be improved.

II. Deterrence of penalty is central to the administrative enforcement of the AML

Administrative antitrust penalties play the most important role in preventing monopolistic conduct. Common administrative antitrust tools include “约谈” (warning interview) and penalties. There is no definition of “warning interview” under the AML or associated regulations but a definition is set out in Article 1 of the Rules of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission for Interviews on Regulatory Responsibilities[10]. Those rules define “warning interview “(“约谈”) as a regulatory measure whereby the regulatory authorities, in accordance with the laws and regulations, meet with the relevant personnel, to give regulatory opinions and suggestions, and to order them to make rectifications and clarify the liability of the responsible personnel. “约谈” may involve several departments working together to communicate with a number of undertakings at the same time, covering a wide range of issues. For example, on November 6, 2020, the SAMR, the Office of the Central Leading Group for Cyberspace Affairs, and the State Administration of Taxation jointly held a warning interview (called an administrative guidance meeting in the press) on regulating the online economic order. In that meeting, the authorities told the internet enterprises attending the meeting that they must not abuse their dominant positions in the market to eliminate or restrict competition.[11] Before “约谈”, the authorities do not need to conduct detailed investigations and evidence collection, define the relevant market, analyze whether the target undertakings exclude or restrict competition, or calculate the number of fines. Compared with the administrative penalty, “约谈” costs less and is more efficient. Thus, “约谈” is used often by authorities when they suspect that undertakings are engaging in illegal conduct.

However, administrative penalties are central to the administrative enforcement of the AML rather than “约谈”. Generally, antitrust authorities may issue a penalty for monopolistic undertakings after a long investigation. The penalty includes the order to stop the monopolistic conduct and a fine based on the sales amount in the previous year of the punished undertaking. Sometimes, authorities may also confiscate the illegal gains of the punished undertakings due to monopolistic conduct. “约谈” is only a “yellow card” (warning). Its deterrence is based on the effective administrative penalty which is the “red card”. Without the deterrence of administrative penalties, a warning interview (“约谈”) could not be effective because undertakings may not follow the requirements set forth by the authorities if there will not be any serious consequences for breaching the requirements. Compared to administrative penalties, a warning interview (“约谈”) is just an amplifier that strengthens the deterrence of administrative penalties. Besides, even if the total number of administrative penalties becomes larger, it is still too small compared to the number of possible undertakings engaging in monopolistic conduct. An administrative penalty may stop monopolistic conduct, but only when it creates adequate deterrence can it really prevent monopolistic conduct, especially in a large economic entity such as China. In a word, the deterrence of administrative penalty is central to the administrative enforcement of the AML in China.

III. Administrative antitrust penalties do not adequately deter

So far, administrative antitrust penalties in China have not created an adequate deterrence to prevent business undertakings from reaching monopolistic agreements and abusing their dominant market position. Many administrative antitrust cases show that administrative antitrust penalties inadequately deter monopolistic conduct. The author provides two examples below.

The first example of inadequate deterrence is that undertakings do not actively stop monopolistic conduct when companies with similar monopolistic conduct are punished. On April 15, 2021, the SAMR imposed an administrative penalty on Yangtze Pharmaceutical Group Co., Ltd. (扬子江药业集团有限公司) for its implementation of a monopoly agreement with a fine in the amount of 3% of its sales amount in the previous year.[12] According to investigations, from 2015 to 2019, Yangtze River Pharmaceutical Group reached and implemented monopolistic agreements with drug wholesalers and retail pharmacies by signing cooperation agreements, issuing price adjustment letters, and oral notices across the country (excluding Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan) that fixed the price or the lowest price of commodities for resale to third parties (resale price maintenance). It is clearly written in Article 14 of AML that reaching agreements on price maintenance is prohibited. It is impossible for a powerful company like Yangtze River to say that it does not know of Article 14 of AML. It is obvious that Yangtze River intended to maintain the price of its products even though it knew that the agreement is a violation of the AML.

Yangtze River legal counsel would have been aware of the penalty decision that the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) imposed on another major company. The NDRC issued its administrative penalty decision to Medtronic (Shanghai) Management Co., Ltd. (美敦力(上海)管理有限公司) in 2016 for resale price maintenance.[13] The fine for Medtronic Management amounted to 118,520,000 yuan (4% of the sales amount in the previous year). This penalty decision was significant because it was the first administrative antitrust penalty in the medical apparatus industry and the amount of fine was large. There were many news reports about this penalty including CCTV 13’s news report at noon[14]. It is impossible for Yangtze River to claim that it does not know a case with similar monopolistic conduct in a related industry. Therefore, it is obvious that Yangtze River knew that it violated AML but it chose to continue the violation even though a company with similar monopolistic conduct was punished.

Many other cases also show that companies know that they violate AML but just choose to continue the monopolistic conduct. The SAMR issued an administrative penalty decision to Alibaba Group Holdings Co., Ltd. (阿里巴巴集团控股有限公司) on April 10, 2021, with a fine of 4% of the sales amount in the previous year. Since 2015, Alibaba has continuously abused its dominant market position in the online retail platform service market in China and implemented the “choice of two”. This conduct restricted the development of other competing platforms. It is clearly written in Article 17 of AML that restricting trading counterparts to transact only with the undertaking by an undertaking with a dominant market position is prohibited. As one of the most powerful Internet companies in China, Alibaba definitely knew of AML Article 17 but it chose not to stop the monopolistic conduct until it was punished.

In one of the ten typical cases of the AML enforcement in 2019 released by the SAMR[15], from 2013 to 2017, when Changan Ford Motor Co., Ltd. (长安福特汽车有限公司) sold “Ford” cars in Chongqing, it did price maintenance with its dealers. Changan Ford was fined in the amount of 4% of the sales amount in the previous year in Chongqing. But before that, Saic General Motors Sales Company Limited (上汽通用汽车销售有限公司) had been punished 4% of the sales amount in the previous year for price maintenance in 2016[16]. Regardless of this, Changan Ford still continued its monopolistic conduct. Similarly, Toyota Motor (China) Holding Ltd. (丰田汽车(中国)投资有限公司) was punished 2% of the sales of the preceding year (only the sales in Jiangsu Province) for similar price-fixing conduct in 2019[17], which shows that it did not stop its monopolistic conduct after Saic General Motor was punished. In the above typical cases, the monopolistic conduct of the companies lasted for many years, although companies with similar monopolistic conduct had been punished. These cases fully demonstrate that China’s previous administrative penalties for reaching monopoly agreements and abuse of dominant market position have not created adequate deterrence to enterprises to stop monopolistic conduct voluntarily.

Another example of the inadequate deterrence of administrative antitrust penalty is that companies that have been punished engage in monopolistic conduct again. In 2013, Yibin Wuliangye Co., Ltd. (宜宾五粮液股份有限公司) issued an announcement stating that its controlling subsidiary had received an administrative penalty decision from the Sichuan Provincial Development and Reform Commission.[18] The penalty decision letter imposed a penalty on Wuliangye’s holding company for violating Article 14 of the AML for price maintenance. The fine was 1% of its sales amount in 2012 (202 million yuan). However, in 2021, the civil judgment in the case of the sale and purchase contract dispute between Beijing Kangyiquan Internet Technology Co., Ltd. and Nanjing Jiuxiting Supply Chain Management Co., Ltd.[19] revealed that Wuliangye was again indirectly maintaining resale price. On June 19, 2020, Wuliangye Company issued a “Rectification Notice” to its business partner Xingjiusheng Company that ordered Xingjiusheng to eliminate the resale of goods below minimum price from it, otherwise, Wuliangye would continue to stop the supply of its goods in the future. The court of the first instance in this case also found that Xingjiusheng Company had “fined” Kang Yiquan Company according to their contract for selling goods of Wuliangye below the minimum price, which means that Xingjiusheng violates Article 14 of the AML because of its restriction on Kang Yiquan’s resale price. However, Wuliangye is the real monopolist that has absolute control over Xingjiusheng and maintains the retail price indirectly. In other words, the anti-monopoly penalty imposed on Wuliangye in 2013 did not deter it from giving up its monopoly behavior, but only prompted it to continue to engage in monopoly behavior in an indirect way.

Another administrative case also shows such kind of repeated violation of the AML. Eastman (China) Investment Management Co., Ltd. (伊士曼(中国)投资管理有限公司)[20] was punished with a fine for 5% of the sales amount in the previous year in 2017 for price maintenance. In 2019, Eastman was punished again with a fine of 5% for its abuse of dominant market position just 2 years after the former antitrust penalty.[21] Due to the small number of administrative antitrust penalties in China, the two cases may be just the tip of the iceberg of repeated violations of the AML. Such a phenomenon is another example of the inadequate deterrence of administrative antitrust penalty.

IV. Reasons for inadequate deterrence of administrative penalty

The AML sets similar penalties for reaching monopolistic agreements and the abuse of dominant market position. As for undertakings that reach and implement a monopolistic agreement, the authority shall order them to stop the violations, confiscate the illegal gains and impose a fine of 1% up to 10% of the sales amount of the previous year. If the monopoly agreement has not been implemented, the authorities may impose a fine of less than 500,000 yuan. The authority shall order the business undertakings who abuse their dominant market position in violation of AML to stop the monopolistic conduct, confiscate the illegal gains, and impose a fine of 1% up to 10% of the total sales volume made in the previous year. Therefore, the penalties for monopoly agreements and abuse of dominant market position are similar.

What makes the deterrence of administrative penalty to reaching monopolistic agreements and abuse of dominant market position inadequate? In my view, the small amount of fines and rare confiscation of illegal income are the main reasons. Fines and confiscation of illegal gains are the key factors that determine the deterrence of an administrative penalty. Even though an administrative antitrust penalty may affect a business undertaking in many aspects, the fine is usually the most significant loss for the business undertaking unless the illegal gains are confiscated. What may be the most important is whether consumers switch to other business undertakings’ commodities or services because of an administrative penalty decision. Thus, if the amount of the fine is so small that makes it acceptable or even profitable for a business undertaking, the administrative antitrust penalty may not deter it from monopolistic conduct. Besides, a small amount of a fine imposed on other similar monopolistic undertakings may even encourage a monopolistic business undertaking to continue its monopolistic conduct rather than stopping it.

The AML sets confiscation of illegal gains and fines as a combination of punishments for business undertakings reaching monopolistic agreements or abusing dominant market position. According to Article 46 and 47 of AML, the antitrust authority should both confiscate the illegal gains of monopolistic behavior and impose a fine in the amount of 1% to 10% of the sales of the previous year for reaching monopolistic agreements or abusing the dominant market position unless the monopolistic agreements have not been implemented. Confiscating illegal gains makes monopolistic conduct unprofitable. Meanwhile, a fine imposes losses for monopolistic business undertakings. The combination of confiscation of illegal gains and fines creates a deterrence to monopolists or possible monopolists as a whole. If it does not confiscate illegal income, the authority has to impose a higher fine which is more difficult to calculate to create adequate deterrence. However, antitrust authorities often impose fines in small amounts and relatively seldom confiscate illegal gains.

The first main reason for inadequate deterrence is that the average amount of fines is relatively small. In 2013, the Sichuan Provincial Development and Reform Commission imposed a fine on Wuliangye’s holding subsidiary as 1% of its sales (202 million yuan) in 2012, which is the minimum proportion of a fine for reaching and implementing monopoly agreements as stipulated by the AML. In 2012, Wuliangye’s net profit attributable to shareholders of the listed company after deducting non-recurring gains and losses was 9,925,097,898.26 yuan[22], which meant that the amount of the anti-monopoly penalty was only 1% of its non-net profit. For Wuliangye, which has a gross profit margin of 70.91%, the fine itself cannot act as a deterrence at all. Since an antitrust penalty does not affect consumer’s choice of goods or services, it will not impact the sales of Wuliangye. Without an impact on sales, the bad news of being punished due to monopolistic conduct was not so important. In the case of Changan Ford’s monopolistic agreement, the authority only penalized Changan Ford’s monopoly actions in Chongqing rather than on the national scale.[23] The fine for Changan Ford was 162.8 million yuan, which is only 4% of its sales in the preceding year. However, when the penalty decision was finally made in 2019, Changan Ford has implemented monopolistic behavior for 7 years. A fine with only 4% of the previous year’s sales makes the monopoly behavior still profitable for Changan Ford. In the case of Alibaba’s abuse of market dominance, the fine for Alibaba was 4% of its domestic sales in 2019. Alibaba’s monopolistic behavior has lasted for 6 years, and the size of this fine does not easily erase the benefits of monopolistic behavior for Alibaba. The low fine sizes in practice is difficult to form a strong deterrent.

A scholar reviewed the 104 national administrative antitrust cases on reaching monopolistic agreements and abuse of dominant market position from August 1, 2008, to April 14, 2020, and found that the proportions of fines in 53.8% of reaching monopolistic agreements and abusing dominant market position cases were less than 3%, and the proportions of fines were just 1% in some important cartel cases.[24] This leads to the conclusion that such a small amount of fines cannot create adequate deterrence to monopolistic conduct. Another scholar, who reviewed the average proportion of fines in the hundreds of administrative penalties since the AML was in effect, argued that the fines were so small that it was hard to create adequate deterrence to monopolistic business undertakings.[25]

The second main reason for inadequate deterrence is that the antitrust authority relatively seldom confiscates illegal gains. According to Articles 46 and 47 of the AML, antitrust authorities are obligated to confiscate illegal gains of reaching monopoly agreements or abuse of dominant market position. Making a fine without confiscating the illegal gains in an administrative antitrust penalty for reaching monopolistic agreements or abuse of dominant market position is inconsistent with the AML. A scholar even wrote a public report letter to the SAMR because two provincial antitrust authorities did not confiscate the illegal gains and did not give a reasonable explanation for their failure to do so.[26] On May 22, 2019, the China Market Supervision News published an interview with Wu Zhenguo, Director of the Anti-Monopoly Bureau of the SAMR stating that in law enforcement practice, it is often difficult to calculate illegal income but even if it cannot be calculated, the reason must be fully explained.[27] Besides, Wu Zhenguo also stated that the base of the fine should be the company’s total sales in the previous year rather than the sales of the products involved. However, in practice, confiscation of illegal income is relatively rare in administrative antitrust penalties, and it is common not to confiscate illegal income. For example, in the cases of Alibaba, Wuliangye, and Changan Ford, the authorities did not confiscate illegal gains. Without confiscating illegal income, even if the SAMR imposes a fine of 1%-10% of the preceding year’s sales, monopolistic conduct may still be profitable. For liquor companies such as Wuliangye, which has a gross profit margin of nearly 70%, and other companies with high gross profit margins, monopolistic conduct can still bring a great deal of profits taken the antitrust penalty into consideration. Under such circumstances, an administrative penalty without confiscation of illegal gains cannot create adequate deterrence.

According to a legal practitioner’s statistics, As of February 7, 2021, the antitrust authorities confiscated illegal gains in only 22% of 106 administrative antitrust cases concerning reaching monopolistic agreements and abuse of dominant market position.[28] Therefore, the small number of confiscations of illegal gains makes it difficult for administrative antitrust penalties to create adequate deterrence to reaching monopolistic agreements and abuse of dominant market position.

V. Suggestions to enhance the deterrence of administrative antitrust penalties

The author’s suggestions on enhancing the deterrence of administrative antitrust penalty to reaching monopolistic agreements and abuse of dominant market position are as follows.

Increase the number of AML enforcement agencies’ staff. At present, China’s AML enforcement agencies at all levels lack sufficient staff. The shortage of human resources for law enforcement has caused law enforcement agencies to be unable to investigate monopoly cases and punish monopoly companies in a comprehensive and timely manner. In addition, due to the lack of human resources for law enforcement, AML enforcement agencies have difficulties in investigating and collecting evidence and rely on the enterprises under investigation to actively cooperate with the investigation. They need to make concessions on the amount of penalties in exchange for the cooperation of the investigated undertakings. The calculation of illegal gains requires detailed investigation and research as well as human resources as a foundation. Therefore, increasing the number of AML enforcement personnel is the basis for increasing the proportion of fines and realizing the confiscation of illegal gains.

Release guidelines for setting fines. The European Commission issued Guidelines on the Method of Setting Fines Imposed Pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation No 1/2003 in 2006[29] that clarifies the calculation of fines in antitrust cases. The antitrust authority in China usually does not show the details of how the fines are decided in the administrative penalty decisions. Thus, antitrust law enforcement in China lacks transparency. The cost of violating the AML is unclear to undertakings, which makes it more difficult for the administrative penalty to act as a deterrent. Releasing guidelines for setting fines not only helps make uniform criteria but also helps create deterrence of administrative penalty.

Release guidelines for calculating illegal gains. The precise amount of illegal gains is the basis for appropriate penalties. Apart from the controversy of different calculation methods, in most cases, it is difficult to differ illegal profit from normal profit when monopolistic conduct does not exist. However, it should not be given up. The SAMR should try to make guidelines for calculating illegal gains. In fact, the Guidelines of the Anti-Monopoly Commission under the State Council on the Identification of Illegal Gains Derived by Operators from Monopolistic Practices and the Determination of Fines against Such Operators (Draft for Comment) was published in 2016 but whether there will be an official version of it is still unknown. Besides, scholars not only call for confiscation of illegal gain but also call for giving an explanation to the public when the confiscation could not be done.[30] Even though the guidelines are difficult to make, the authority should still give a reasonable explanation for its actions.

Increase the proportion of fines in administrative antitrust penalties. The proportion of China’s administrative antitrust fines for reaching monopolistic agreements and abuse of dominant market position is too small, which is harmful to enhance the deterrence of these administrative penalties. Strong sanctions motivate monopolistic undertakings to cooperate with the authorities in investigations.[31] China antitrust authorities should try to increase the number of fines in practice, especially for industries with a high ratio of net profit. Higher and reasonable fines can enhance the deterrence of administrative antitrust penalties and motivate business undertakings to cooperate with investigations.

VI. Conclusion

Nowadays, China is enhancing administrative antitrust enforcement but has not yet created adequate deterrence to reaching monopolistic agreements and abuse of dominant market position. The main reasons for inadequate deterrence are the small amount of fines and too few confiscations of illegal gains. China needs to strengthen administrative antitrust by increasing the number of staff of antitrust authorities, releasing guidelines for setting fines and guidelines for calculating illegal gains, and increasing the amount of fines in administrative penalties so as to create adequate deterrence to reaching monopolistic agreements and abuse of dominant market position to fulfill the purpose of the AML. In a word, China has a long way to go in antitrust but is marching forward now.

  1. Shao Yang, a J.D/J.M. candidate at Peking University School of Transnational Law. The author is very grateful for Professor Susan Finder’s gracious, patient guidance and revision. The author also thanks Mr. Chen Liang and Ms. Wang Zhipei for their inspiring advice.
  2. Central Economic Working Conference has been held in Beijing, Xinhua News Agency, December 12, 2020, available at https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1686411723755677989&wfr=spider&for=pc. 
  3. Summary and Review of Antitrust Administrative Law Enforcement in 2018, Competition Law of Wuhan University (Jan. 8, 2019), https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/Pq88fOdFdEbMjml1IJq2mQ
  4. Anti-monopoly Bureau of State Administration for Market Regulation, 2019 China Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Annual Report (2020). 
  5. Liu Xu, Statistics of Anti-monopoly Law Enforcement Data in 2020, Cold Thinking on the Competitive Law of Shao Geng (Jan. 6, 2021), https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/iPYJK6dHDr5kuUAL6by2Dg, last visited on June 24, 2021. 
  6. The State Administration for Market Regulation, Administrative Penalty Decision Letter No.28 (2021). 
  7. See General Office of National Development and Reform Commission, Administrative Penalty Decision Letter of Price Supervision No.1 (2015).
  8. Anti-monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China, Presidential Decree No. 68 of the People’s Republic of China, August 30, 2007. 
  9. Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Report on the Nature and Impact of Hard Code Cartels and Sanctions against Cartels under National Competition Laws (2002), available at http://www.oecd.org/competition/cartels/2081831.pdf. 
  10. The State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council, the Rules of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission for Interviews on Regulatory Responsibilities (2021). 
  11. The State Administration for Market Regulation, the Office of the Central Leading Group for Cyberspace Affairs and the State Administration of Taxation Jointly Hold the Administrative Guidance Meeting for Regulating the Online Economic Order, Website of the State Administration for Market Regulation (November. 6, 2020), http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2020-11/06/content_5558481.htm
  12. The State Administration for Market Regulation, Administrative Penalty Decision Letter No.29 (2021). 
  13. The National Development and Reform Commission, Administrative Penalty Decision Letter No.8 (2016). 
  14. NDRC: A Fine of RMB118.5 Million for “Medtronic” for Price Monopoly, China Central Television, December 7, 2016, http://tv.cctv.com/2016/12/07/VIDEyILyBXw1RNJkPdtjV6Hf161207.shtml. 
  15. The State Administration for Market Regulation released 10 Typical Cases on Anti-monopoly Law Enforcement in 2019, Website of The State Administration for Market Regulation, December 25, 2020, http://www.samr.gov.cn/xw/zj/202012/t20201224_324675.html. 
  16. Shanghai Municipal Price Bureau, Administrative Penalty Decision Letter No.2520160027 (2016). 
  17. Jiangsu Provincial Administration for Market Regulation, Antitrust Administrative Penalty Decision Letter No.1 (2019). 
  18. Yibin Wuliangye Co., Ltd., Announcement on Receipt of the Administrative Penalty Decision Issued by Sichuan Development and Reform Commission by the Controlled Subsidiaries, February 23, 2013, http://www.szse.cn/disclosure/listed/bulletinDetail/index.html?5e05dd18-cc0c-459a-a161-6019ae4e7737. 
  19. Kangyiquan Internet Technology Co., Ltd. v. Nanjing Jiuxiting Supply Chain Management Co., Ltd., Su 01 Civil Final Judgement No. 2382 (2021), Intermediate People’s Court of Nanjing City, Jiangsu Province. 
  20. Shanghai Municipal Price Bureau, Administrative Penalty Decision Letter No.2520170032(2017). 
  21. Shanghai Municipal Market Regulatory Administration, Administrative Penalty Decision Letter No.000201710047(2019). 
  22. See Wuliangye Yibin Co., Ltd, Annual Report (2012), http://www.szse.cn/disclosure/listed/bulletinDetail/index.html?03129132-4bc9-4cc3-9f88-46ab53049e43. 
  23. supra note 15. 
  24. Wang Jian, The System Cause of Insufficient Deterrence of Antitrust Fine in Our Country and its solution[J], Law Review, Rev.222, 110 (2020). 
  25. Jiang Yanbo, A Research of Confiscation of Illegal Gains in Antitrust from the Economic Law Perspective[J], Economic Law Symposium, Rev.29, 143-144 (2020). 
  26. Liu Xu, Report: The Failure of the Guangdong Bureau and the Qinghai Bureau to Confiscate the Illegal Gains in accordance with the Law Is Suspected of Violating the Legislative Interpretation of the Anti-Monopoly Law Made by the Legislative Affairs Commission of the Standing Committee Of the National People’s Congress, Cold Thinking on the Competitive Law of Shao Geng (June. 23, 2020), https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/4QrdqTSz-gfb3DBjk8di-w
  27. Nitai, Exclusive interview with Wu Zhengguo, Director of the Anti-monopoly Bureau under the State Administration for Market Regulation, China Market Regulatory News (May. 22, 2019), https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_3506260, last visited on July 30, 2021. 
  28. Ma Dong, Empirical Study and Reflection on the Application of Confiscation of Illegal Proceeds in Antimonopoly, Beijing Yuntian Law Firm (Feb. 19, 2021), https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/mh-mLhhd6ybyt_K2tPMGOw
  29. See European Commission, Method of Setting Fines Imposed Pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation No 1/2003 (2006). 
  30. Wu Yinghai, Do Not Forget the Confiscation of Illegal Gain in Administrative Antitrust Penalties, Procuratorate Daily, August 14, 2013, at A6
  31. supra note 9, at 3. 

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